Abstract
By revisiting classical debates on revelation, divine speech, and interpretation across Kalām and Sufi traditions, this essay argues that conceptions of normative authority are fundamentally shaped by one’s theology of revelation. Drawing on Muʿtazilite rationalism, Sunni theological distinctions between eternal and created speech, and Akbarī Sufi metaphysics, the essay highlights a recurring distinction between the eternal divine will and its historically mediated articulation in human language. On this basis, it concludes that Islamism is not the only theologically legitimate position within Islam, nor is contextualism inherently deviant, but rather a position grounded in long-standing Islamic reflections on the nature of revelation itself.
Keywords
Islamism, Contextualism, Qur’anic Hermeneutics, Muʿāmalāt, Sharia, Revelation, Sunni Theology, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-ʿArabī, Normativity
There can be various interpretations of what Islamism entails. Yet when the term “Islamist” is commonly used, it usually refers to groups who believe that Islamic norms are applicable to every sphere of life and who insist, in particular, on the implementation of Islamic law, especially its muʿāmalāt dimensions such as civil and criminal law, within state governance. In this brief essay, I aim to examine the theological viability of Islamism understood in this sense.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that interpretations of Islamic ethico-legal norms (particularly those related to muʿāmalāt) can broadly be classified into two categories: (a) literalist/universalist readings and (b) contextualist/historicist readings.
The first approach maintains that the ethico-legal rulings articulated in the Qurʾān are binding for all times and places until the Day of Judgment. The second contends that a subset of these rulings were shaped by the historical context of revelation and are therefore not necessarily binding in the present. Many, however, remain largely non-committal on this issue and tacitly incline toward the former position, while refraining from articulating it explicitly, often due to concerns about its contemporary political implications and the perceived theological risks associated with the latter position.
The tension between literalist and contextualist readings is not a modern phenomenon; it stretches back to the earliest centuries of Islamic intellectual history (though early debates were largely theological rather than concerned with muʿāmalāt). One of the first significant challenges to literalism emerged among the Muʿtazilite theologians. Drawing upon a rationalist framework influenced by Greek philosophy and driven by a strong desire to distinguish Islam from other religious traditions, the Muʿtazila developed taʾwīl as a systematic interpretive methodology. This allowed them to read Qurʾānic verses in ways consistent with their broader theological commitments.
The Mu‘tazilite doctrine of the createdness of the Qurʾān clearly pointed to its historical emergence. Some scholars have interpreted this position as politically motivated, suggesting that the Muʿtazila sought to affirm the authority of human reason and, by extension, the legislative role of the Abbasid caliphate alongside revelation. I support the view that, however, the decisive motive behind the Muʿtazilite doctrine of the createdness of the Qurʾān was theological rather than political. The Muʿtazila regarded it as essential to safeguard Islam’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis other religions, particularly Christianity. To assert that the Qurʾān is uncreated, they feared, risked approximating the Christian doctrine of incarnation, wherein the divine Word is believed to have become flesh in the person of Jesus.[1]
“Debates over the nature of revelation across Islamic schools ultimately revolve around a single question: how an eternal, universal, and infinite divine attribute becomes manifest within a created and limited domain.”
A second major challenge to literalism arose within Sufism. Sufis emphasized the inner, spiritual dimension of prophethood and maintained that the Prophet’s spiritual inheritors—namely the saints—could articulate insights inaccessible through outward transmission alone. A strictly literalist and report-based approach to the Qurʾān left little space for this spiritual epistemology. Consequently, despite deep differences in orientation and purpose, Sufis adopted interpretive strategies similar to those of the Muʿtazila. Like them, they read Qurʾānic expressions beyond their surface meanings, while repeatedly insisting, often defensively, that they did not deny the validity of the literal sense.
Within this broader trajectory, Ibn al-ʿArabī articulated some of the most striking formulations. He famously distinguished between risāla (messengership) and wilāya (sainthood), arguing for the ontological primacy of the latter. This claim was frequently misunderstood as asserting the superiority of the saint over the prophet, thereby leading to accusations of heresy. As shown by Michel Chodkiewicz, however, Ibn al-ʿArabī’s argument does not concern personal rank but rather the universal and historical dimensions of prophethood.[2] Wilāya designates the prophet’s enduring capacity for direct encounter with the Divine, whereas risāla refers to the historically conditioned articulation of that encounter within a specific community and moment. To borrow a contemporary analogy: wilāya is like having the ability to connect by owning a phone, whereas risāla is the particular conversation conducted through it.
This framework was further elaborated by the successors of Ibn al-ʿArabī, a point I have explored elsewhere.[3] In his Commentary on Sūrat al-Fātiḥa, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī offers a detailed account of how divine revelation descends through successive ontological levels before assuming the form of human language. On this view, the recited Qurʾān represents the manifestation of the divine attribute of speech within the temporal and finite human realm. Although this attribute is inseparable from the divine essence itself, its linguistic articulation necessarily bears both divine and human dimensions.
“Despite their doctrinal differences, Sunni theologians outside the Salafī tradition, together with the Muʿtazila, Muslim philosophers, and Akbarī Sufis, converge on a crucial point: the boundless divine reality of revelation (divine speech) is distinct from its finite manifestation in human language.”
Al-Qūnawī’s foremost interpreter, Shams al‑Dīn al‑Fanārī, developed this idea further through the theory of muʿallaqāt (relational determinations). According to this view, all prophets encounter the same divine reality, yet that reality is expressed differently in each prophetic mission—appearing as Hebrew, Aramaic, or Arabic revelation depending on context.[4] In this respect, Akbarī Sufis converge with Muslim Neoplatonic philosophers in distinguishing between transcendent truth and its historical articulation.
Debates over the nature of revelation across Islamic schools ultimately revolve around a single question: how an eternal, universal, and infinite divine attribute becomes manifest within a created and limited domain. The most uncompromising answer is found in the Hanbalī-Salafī position articulated by Ibn Taymiyya, according to which the Qurʾān we recite is identical to God’s eternal speech. By contrast, mainstream Sunni theology distinguishes between God’s eternal inner speech (kalām nafsī) and its linguistic expression in scripture. The former is uncreated; the latter is created—whether in the Preserved Tablet (al-Lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ), in the Angel of revelation (Jabrāīl), or through prophetic articulation.[5]
Despite their doctrinal differences, Sunni theologians outside the Salafī tradition, together with the Muʿtazila, Muslim philosophers, and Akbarī Sufis, converge on a crucial point: the boundless divine reality of revelation (divine speech) is distinct from its finite manifestation in human language. Accordingly, the articulation of the divine will within human speech is necessarily contingent, limited, and shaped by historical conditions. Prophets thus receive messages that emerge through their encounter with the Divine and address the concrete circumstances of their communities. Some of these messages may indeed carry universal significance, but not all are required to do so. To insist otherwise effectively entails adopting a strictly Salafī paradigm.
This distinction between eternal divine speech and its non-eternal manifestation in human language amounts, in effect, to an acknowledgment of the historical context in which revelation is articulated. While such reflections in Islamic intellectual history were formulated primarily in theological terms rather than in relation to muʿāmalāt, the hermeneutical logic they articulate can nonetheless be extended to ethico-legal reasoning. The divine will, as expressed in sacred texts, operates within the constraints of human language and cognition. It responds to particular events and questions, addresses specific individuals and social conditions, and reflects the contours of the milieu in which it is revealed. The discipline of asbāb al-nuzūl itself presupposes this contextual embeddedness. The question—would the Qurʾān be identical if the Prophet had lived in a different time and place?—is therefore not merely speculative; it directly shapes our understanding of whether Qurʾānic rulings on muʿāmalāt bind communities across radically different historical settings.
“Once revelation is understood as occurring within a specific time and place and in dynamic interaction with its historical context, it becomes unavoidable to recognize that certain rulings articulated in that context may not be universally binding. From this perspective, Islamism cannot be regarded as the only theologically legitimate option. Nor should a contextualist reading of Qurʾānic norms be hastily branded as doctrinally deviant.”
A common objection arises here: historical emergence does not preclude universal norms. This is undoubtedly true in matters of faith, which are inherently trans-historical, and in acts of worship, which can only be known through revelation. Matters of social interaction, however, are more susceptible to historical change. While moral principles—such as the wrongness of theft—remain constant, their legal implementation may vary across societies. One may argue, of course, that Qurʾānic penalties represent an ideal normative model; such arguments, however, properly belong to sociological or ethical analysis rather than to theological inquiry as understood here.
My purpose here has been deliberately limited. I have sought to show that our theology of revelation decisively shapes how we conceive normativity. Once revelation is understood as occurring within a specific time and place and in dynamic interaction with its historical context, it becomes unavoidable to recognize that certain rulings articulated in that context may not be universally binding. From this perspective, Islamism cannot be regarded as the only theologically legitimate option. Nor should a contextualist reading of Qurʾānic norms be hastily branded as doctrinally deviant. Rather, such an approach emerges as a theologically intelligible position grounded in long-standing Islamic reflections on the nature of divine revelation itself.
[1] See Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 235–260.
[2] Michel Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ʿArabī, trans. Liadain Sherrard (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), esp. chs. 1–3.
[3] For further information, see Halim Calis, “The Hadith ‘Four Aspects of the Qur’an’ and the Evolution of Sufi Exegesis.” Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 22.3 (2020).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Halim Calis, “The Theoretical Foundations of Contextual Interpretation of the Qur’an in Islamic Theological Schools and Philosophical Sufism.” Religions 13.2 (2022).
